Turkiye Is Ready to Open a New Containment Front against Russia in the Black Sea
Yves here. Turkiye does not want the Black Sea to become a Russian lake. But what is the cost?
By Andrew Korybko, an American political analyst based in Moscow who focuses on the transition of the global system to multipolarity in the New Cold War. He has a PhD from MGIMO, which is under the umbrella of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Originally published on his website
Turkish Foreign Minister and former intelligence officer Hakan Fidan confirmed in a joint press conference with his Ukrainian counterpart that Turkey will ensure the security of the Ukrainian sea after the end of the ongoing conflict. In his words, “Türkiye has agreed to lead the naval component, and we have a common understanding in this regard with our partners. Planning efforts on this matter are also carried out by the naval forces of the relevant allied countries.” This represents a serious danger to Russia’s interests.
The form it will take remains to be seen, but Turkiye may escort Ukrainian grain ships even before the end of the conflict after Russian “planned strikes” took a third of Ukraine’s shipping capabilities offline. According to Reuters, “agricultural exports such as grain and vegetable oil remain Ukraine’s main source of foreign exchange”, and the proceeds help pay European debts. European members of NATO therefore have a financial incentive to support any Turkish escort mission.
The US may also request this Turkish service as part of the quid pro quo for any potential F-35 sales. Trump has recently decided to “escalate the economic slowdown” with Russia so it follows that he may ask some of his country’s smaller allies like Turkey to do more of the “heavy lifting” this time around. Turkiye is already part of the “cordon sanitaire” along Russia’s southern border in the South Caucasus, the Caspian Sea, and Central Asia as described here so expanding it to include the Black Sea would not be surprising.
It would certainly be provocative from Russia’s point of view if it happened during a war, however, but whether Russia would attack the Turkish fleet at the risk of triggering World War III remains to be seen. It is the same if Turkiye in one way or another tries to protect Ukrainian ports, such as sending some of its ships there for the reason of “preventing” Russia from taking offline any agricultural export capabilities of Ukraine, even if this is just a cover to protect naval equipment.
The potential long-term implications of Turkey guaranteeing Ukraine’s maritime security concern Russia more than the short-term potential during the ongoing conflict. The 1936 Montreux Convention limits foreign warships in the Black Sea to nine, but NATO members Turkey, Bulgaria, and Romania can have as many as they like as they border the waters. Therefore, the rapid development of their military capabilities in the coming years cannot be ruled out.
NATO has long wanted to turn the Black Sea into a “NATO lake” as some believe it has since been done in the Baltic Sea following the official membership of Finland and Sweden after being shadow members since the end of the Old Cold War. To that end, Turkey may help Bulgaria, Romania, and Ukraine develop their navies over the coming years, with the goal of jointly defeating Russia’s Black Sea Fleet, which has been degraded by the Western-backed invasion of Ukraine.
Despite official statements to the contrary, Turkiye undoubtedly poses a great risk to Russia’s interests, which will continue to grow as it takes on more responsibilities for integration in line with its role in the “cordon sanitaire”. So Russia can accept this as a “new normal” and therefore agree to a collective agreement, which will contradict everything that was supposed to be done by the special task, or compete with Turkiye across the entire southern area to protect its interests.
