The Islamic Republic of Iran imposes national law, represented by the Iranian government, over Islamic canonical law, commonly referred to as Sharia. Khomeini instituted this program to overcome certain weaknesses within Shiism that had caused several historical divisions and to empower the state.
In Shiism, the principle of authority is hereditary. It descends from Ali—cousin and son-in-law of the Prophet Muhammad—through the family line of the Imams. It can be argued that this genealogy was compiled as a doctrine in response to the Umayyads who included hereditary power, although for the Shia, this is a fundamental theological principle.
The Shia are divided into several branches, mainly the Fivers (Zaydis), the Seveners (Ismailis), and the Twelvers, the latter being the largest group and the one on which the Iranian Republic is based. There are other, smaller sects. The main reason for the successive splits was the disagreement about the identity of the next Imam or leader.
The Shia believe that after the Prophet, God chose members of his family to lead the community, starting with his friend Ali and then his grandsons Hasan and Husayn. But after the death of the fourth Imam, Ali ibn al-Husayn, the first schism occurred. Those known as Zaydis insist that his son, Zayd ibn Ali (killed in the Umayyad revolt), was the fifth Imam and that the line ended there.
The Ismailis and the Twelvers, however, believe that the lineage continued not to him, but to his brother, Muhammad al-Baqir. The next division arose out of a disagreement about who was the next Imam after the death of the sixth Imam, Jafar ibn Muhammad. Ismailis believe that the seventh and last living Imam was his son, Ismail ibn Jafar, and originally believed that he was the end of the line (while the current Ismailis, who are closely related to the Aga Khan, have a different belief).
The Twelvers, however, maintains that the seventh Imam was Musa ibn Jafar and that the line continues until the twelfth Imam, Muhammad al-Mahdi, who was not killed, but entered wisdom in the year 874 and will return at the end of time to establish justice in the world.
The issue of the inheritance of power, both spiritual and earthly, was an important factor that divided the Shia community. And although the great schism ended with the “divining” of the twelfth Imam, the issue of who would rule in his absence began to dominate the Shia political agenda. During the period known as the “Lesser Occultation” which lasted about 70 years, it is believed that the Imam communicated with four deputies. But after the death of the fourth viceroy without a designated successor, the era of “Great Divination” began, which continues to this day.
From that time until the advent of Khomeini, Shiism was not a unified political force. Power is divided between scholars and kings. Scholars, who eventually became known as Ayatollahs, were legitimate religious representatives, while kings, such as the Safavids or the Qajar, were considered divinely illegitimate but necessary to maintain order. This division created a certain peace, which was allowed by the belief that there would be no true justice until the return of the hidden Imam, the Mahdi.
This context is important in understanding the magnitude of the change brought about by Ruhollah Khomeini. The main religious concept with political implications that he introduced was the doctrine of Wilayat al-Faqih. According to this, the leadership of the Imam (although this only applies to the Shia) during the Imam’s divination focuses on a just and reliable jurisprudence, or faqih. This is included in Article 5 of the Iranian Constitution.
In fact, what he achieved was the merging of worldly and spiritual power into a religious figure, the Supreme Leader. Western history is not familiar with this dichotomy.
The “Two Swords” doctrine was formalized by Pope Gelasius I in the 5th century as Duo Sunt (“Two”): Sacerdotium and Regnum. The Church said that while the Devil ruled the body and the world, the Church ruled the soul. This created an often violent “checks and balances” system, such as the Investiture Controversy, where Popes and Holy Roman Emperors fought for the right to appoint bishops.
The source of the auctoritas and the legitimacy of governance became one of the main sources of political conflict and political theory, which culminated in the emergence of the nation state. Carl Schmitt famously asserted that “all the essential concepts of the modern theory of the state are theological concepts of religion.” A perfect king took the place of an almighty God. When the West approached the nation, the “state of difference” moved from God/Church to the executive branch (President or Governor), thus making the nation perfect. That is, he was given a the auctoritas and the legality of legislating and making laws according to its logic.
Khomeini tried to do “the perverse way of secularism.” After the Iranian Revolution and in the midst of a growing wave of Arab nationalism, he took the absolute sovereignty demanded by modern nations and returned it to the lawmaker. By doing so, he eliminated duality.
However, he introduced another change in teachings. He declared that the law is an instrument of justice and that justice is above the law. Traditionally, in both Sunni and Shia cultures, human law is subordinate to Sharia; any human government is responsible for it. Khomeini’s approach places Islamic government above Sharia. No law is higher than the law of the land.
This is Wael Hallaq’s argument in The Impossible State: an “Islamic state” is impossible because the ultimate authority has been changed. In Khomeini’s formulation, the final authority is the Republic and the law of the land. Sharia is an inspiration, to be interpreted by the Supreme Leader to guide the state while the last Imam is “on the book”, but not the law of the land.
Khomeini successfully created the necessary conditions for the emergence of a Shia nation state. By giving sovereignty—that is, according to Hallaq, legislative authority—to the country, he reduced the traditional system of “government under Sharia” to “government above Sharia.” So that this was not just a state, he appointed a just faqih, the Supreme Leader, as the guardian of the state.
However, as it may be argued at this time of conflict, does the Supreme Leader really rule or is it the state machine, as represented in its various factions? If so, one might ask how the Iranian Republic’s geography is more general than Islamic? Carl Schmitt would argue that sovereignty lies with anyone who can posit a different position.
This same argument can be made, albeit with different variations, about many nations that claim to be Muslims.
